Danish-Norwegian Naval Doctrine
Part of the most important element of any fleet is knowing what one actually intends to do with it. Therefor, the Danish navy has been performing a strategic review of what it intends to do in a war against any possible enemies - these being outlined as Russia, Sweden, Britain, France, and Spain. Not all of these are viewed as likely enemies, but plans are still drawn up nevertheless for how to engage them. The idea of these is not only to enable the war to be fought and prosecuted, but also to enable the Danish-Norwegian navy to have a firm grasp of its planning and expansion.
[code]Denmark-Norway currently has a large and balanced fleet, as well as a very extensive merchant marine, and very important naval interests in both protecting this merchant marine and its commerce, defending Denmark, and keeping lines of communication open between the two ocean-separated parts of the Kingdom - Denmark and Norway. A variety of enemies might potentially threaten it, and plans against them are laid out below.
The principal war which is expected by the Danish-Norwegian fleet is against Sweden, which has a large Baltic fleet of its own. In this war, the focus of the Danish-Norwegian navy would be to keep the Swedes bottled up in the Baltic, unable to come out to the broader ocean, to secure lines of communication to Norway, to guard our merchant fleet, to support the possibility for landings and operations in Scania. It would use its frigate fleet and lighter forces to both guard its own commerce, but more importantly to seek out Swedish coastal shipping and to harm its general trade in the Baltic, but the blockade of the Oresund and other straits would effectively prevent any broader Swedish commerce on the high seas. Naval artillery batteries along the coast would help to close it off. Sweden has no colonial empire to take. In effect, any war with Sweden is not viewed as a serious threat, naval-wise, and it is one where we can achieve decisive maritime advantage. Broadly, the same can be said about Russia. Other Baltic states possess no serious navy, making blockade and destruction of their shipping easier.
Outside of the Baltic, our interests principally concern the protection of our rights as neutrals. In this regard, it must be admitted that the principal potential rival is whoever has the strongest navy, which currently is the Royal Navy. Due to being significantly stronger than both the French and Spanish navies, the Royal Navy's privileges threaten to run rough-shod over the rights of neutrals. Inherently, our situation internally is diplomatic, in that the navy requires cooperation with other European medium and small powers who are neutral in time of war, who can provide allies who will be sufficiently large to ensure our rights and interests. In such regards, the most obvious ally is the Netherlands, with whom we have no profound disagreements. Together, our fleets are sufficient in size to be able to counter-balance the Bourbon fleets against the English, which would force respect for our trade and commerce. We should also maintain openness to alliance with both Sweden and Russia, despite diplomatic concerns otherwise, as well as with other nations. In the event of a Russo-Swedish alliance, judged unlikely but which must be examined, we would be reduced to a purely littoral and defensive role, but would still be able to heavily harm enemy commerce passing through the straights, and so our naval geography would still lend us a decisive advantage.
We share no serious disagreements with the French or Spanish who constitute the Bourbon bloc, and it is not seen as likely that any war against them could break out. If it does, then our interests will be to secure an alliance with England to enable the resumption of our trade, and the most speedy possible end to the war. Our navy would be in a defensive role on its own, and any military troops would be deployed defensively to protect Danish colonial settlements. Our fleet would be heavily outmatched against the Franco-Spanish units on their own, and therefor would not sortie, save for frigate for raiding purposes in the Atlantic. Our forces at home would be charged principally with keeping lines of communication intact to Norway, which would be difficult and achieved by running units when the enemy is not present, blockade runners, overnight voyages, etc. If we have local superiority in our waters, we would be able to sortie forth to engage the enemy fleet on our terms. In this war, our units would be able to operate better in the shallow waters which our fleet is designed for, meaning that aggressive operations would be constantly undertaken on the assumption that the enemy would be unable to pursue with heavy forces. Gunboats would form a force for constantly harassing the enemy and striking their convoys. Enemy landings or bombardment of Copenhagen are a very serious issue given the fragmented nature of the kingdom, but the measure of their superiority is not so marked as to make this impossible to prevent. In particular, we would attempt to deny shipments of timber to the French and Spanish, which is vital for their naval fleet construction. If we were part of a broader alliance with the United Kingdom or other anti-Bourbon groups, our fleet would be able to support offensive operations to seize colonies in the Caribbean, India, and Africa. Overall, it is felt reasonably confident that the Navy could acquit itself reasonably well, and while on its own against the Spanish and French it would be unable to project power, it could secure the defense of Denmark-Norway without excessive problems.
Any potential war with Britain raises a much more serious issue, in that the Royal Navy has closer bases to us, and a crushing superiority in ships. It is envisioned that all that can be done is to engage in littoral warfare to attempt to block shipments of timber and other Baltic naval supplies to the United Kingdom, using principally gunboats and occasional sorties of ships of the line. Coastal batteries can also close off some straits, and smuggling will be all that can be done to continue trade between Denmark and Norway. Copenhagen would be very vulnerable to bombardment, if the British were willing to break the laws of war in such regards. Presumably we would attempt to get the Spanish and French onto our side, if they were not already in the war, but would still face numerical inferiority. Our contribution to the war would be important to ensure that our interests are respected post-war, as at this point the difference between the two sides is enough that a flexible strategy could be adopted. It is envisioned either reinforcing French fleets in the channel or Franco-Spanish fleets in the Caribbean, and using our frigates as part of a global commerce raiding campaign.
The Barbary pirates are a constant nuisance and our fleet should continue its patrols with frigates and other ships to protect our trade against them.
War is not viewed as a serious possibility against any other power. Against the Dutch, our focus would be on winning naval superiority against them to blockade them, while invading their colonies in the West Indies and parts of India. Against the Portuguese, the distance is too great to conduct a blockade, but some invasion of Brazil might be contemplated as well as attacks in India. No other nation has any serious threat or gains which can be made against them, and our operations would suffice with commerce raiding.
It is understood that principal objectives for the navy should be a continued and measured expansion of its forces as economic conditions allow. As potential enemies include both nations which are weaker than us, and nations which are significantly stronger, our fleet can neither focus on a purely battle line role nor upon a commerce raiding war. Instead, we should constitute a balanced fleet, based upon ships of the line, frigates, and a complement of gunboats for littoral defense, supporting amphibious operations, and wearing down enemy forces attempting a close blockade of our shores. With such a fleet we can form an important part of a fleet against any power bloc and hence making our own diplomatic position secure, as well as holding against any Baltic power.
The other aspect which is envisioned as important for the continued enhancement of the marine is improvement to coastal defenses. Naturally, given our extensive coast line, it is not possible to secure all of it with guns. However, some parts must be. It is envisioned that Copenhagen will receive a modernization of its artillery with a larger number of better protected, more modern guns, to defend the navy's ship anchorages. The Lillebelt should be fortified in the West, with gun batteries positioned on both shores near Middelfart, with multiple batteries positioned at various locations to close this area where the strait is barely, and often less than, a kilometer wide. Oslo has superb naval geography to resist assault, but gun positions should be expanded at Oscaborg, and combined with mobile forces it should be enough to prevent any landing at the city itself. Occasional strengthening of batteries along the rest of Norway and Denmark is envisioned, but Norway is best defended with gunboats, while the Danish army should be able to defend the rest of Jutland. The one exception is Heligoland, which with extensive fortifications can provide for an important forward naval base, which can defend coastal shipping to Holland or France. This would be composed of gun batteries, anti-landing defenses, barracks, tunnels, supply and ammunition magazines, and a significant naval base for supply and repair of ships. Overseas, it is envisioned that minor fortifications can be constructed to protect Iceland but their main defense is how worthless they are, while the Danish West Indies receive additional gun batteries and fortifications, intended to enable them to survive a lengthy siege. African or Indian possessions are not worth the cost of fortifying. Our colonial efforts which are ongoing in Diego Saurez in Madagascar already are envisioned to have sufficient defenses.
These coastal fortifications are not intended to simply act on their own, but rather to work in partnership with our fleet to protect our possessions, to provide additional strategic mobility, and to free up naval assets for usage elsewhere.[/code]
[code]Denmark-Norway currently has a large and balanced fleet, as well as a very extensive merchant marine, and very important naval interests in both protecting this merchant marine and its commerce, defending Denmark, and keeping lines of communication open between the two ocean-separated parts of the Kingdom - Denmark and Norway. A variety of enemies might potentially threaten it, and plans against them are laid out below.
The principal war which is expected by the Danish-Norwegian fleet is against Sweden, which has a large Baltic fleet of its own. In this war, the focus of the Danish-Norwegian navy would be to keep the Swedes bottled up in the Baltic, unable to come out to the broader ocean, to secure lines of communication to Norway, to guard our merchant fleet, to support the possibility for landings and operations in Scania. It would use its frigate fleet and lighter forces to both guard its own commerce, but more importantly to seek out Swedish coastal shipping and to harm its general trade in the Baltic, but the blockade of the Oresund and other straits would effectively prevent any broader Swedish commerce on the high seas. Naval artillery batteries along the coast would help to close it off. Sweden has no colonial empire to take. In effect, any war with Sweden is not viewed as a serious threat, naval-wise, and it is one where we can achieve decisive maritime advantage. Broadly, the same can be said about Russia. Other Baltic states possess no serious navy, making blockade and destruction of their shipping easier.
Outside of the Baltic, our interests principally concern the protection of our rights as neutrals. In this regard, it must be admitted that the principal potential rival is whoever has the strongest navy, which currently is the Royal Navy. Due to being significantly stronger than both the French and Spanish navies, the Royal Navy's privileges threaten to run rough-shod over the rights of neutrals. Inherently, our situation internally is diplomatic, in that the navy requires cooperation with other European medium and small powers who are neutral in time of war, who can provide allies who will be sufficiently large to ensure our rights and interests. In such regards, the most obvious ally is the Netherlands, with whom we have no profound disagreements. Together, our fleets are sufficient in size to be able to counter-balance the Bourbon fleets against the English, which would force respect for our trade and commerce. We should also maintain openness to alliance with both Sweden and Russia, despite diplomatic concerns otherwise, as well as with other nations. In the event of a Russo-Swedish alliance, judged unlikely but which must be examined, we would be reduced to a purely littoral and defensive role, but would still be able to heavily harm enemy commerce passing through the straights, and so our naval geography would still lend us a decisive advantage.
We share no serious disagreements with the French or Spanish who constitute the Bourbon bloc, and it is not seen as likely that any war against them could break out. If it does, then our interests will be to secure an alliance with England to enable the resumption of our trade, and the most speedy possible end to the war. Our navy would be in a defensive role on its own, and any military troops would be deployed defensively to protect Danish colonial settlements. Our fleet would be heavily outmatched against the Franco-Spanish units on their own, and therefor would not sortie, save for frigate for raiding purposes in the Atlantic. Our forces at home would be charged principally with keeping lines of communication intact to Norway, which would be difficult and achieved by running units when the enemy is not present, blockade runners, overnight voyages, etc. If we have local superiority in our waters, we would be able to sortie forth to engage the enemy fleet on our terms. In this war, our units would be able to operate better in the shallow waters which our fleet is designed for, meaning that aggressive operations would be constantly undertaken on the assumption that the enemy would be unable to pursue with heavy forces. Gunboats would form a force for constantly harassing the enemy and striking their convoys. Enemy landings or bombardment of Copenhagen are a very serious issue given the fragmented nature of the kingdom, but the measure of their superiority is not so marked as to make this impossible to prevent. In particular, we would attempt to deny shipments of timber to the French and Spanish, which is vital for their naval fleet construction. If we were part of a broader alliance with the United Kingdom or other anti-Bourbon groups, our fleet would be able to support offensive operations to seize colonies in the Caribbean, India, and Africa. Overall, it is felt reasonably confident that the Navy could acquit itself reasonably well, and while on its own against the Spanish and French it would be unable to project power, it could secure the defense of Denmark-Norway without excessive problems.
Any potential war with Britain raises a much more serious issue, in that the Royal Navy has closer bases to us, and a crushing superiority in ships. It is envisioned that all that can be done is to engage in littoral warfare to attempt to block shipments of timber and other Baltic naval supplies to the United Kingdom, using principally gunboats and occasional sorties of ships of the line. Coastal batteries can also close off some straits, and smuggling will be all that can be done to continue trade between Denmark and Norway. Copenhagen would be very vulnerable to bombardment, if the British were willing to break the laws of war in such regards. Presumably we would attempt to get the Spanish and French onto our side, if they were not already in the war, but would still face numerical inferiority. Our contribution to the war would be important to ensure that our interests are respected post-war, as at this point the difference between the two sides is enough that a flexible strategy could be adopted. It is envisioned either reinforcing French fleets in the channel or Franco-Spanish fleets in the Caribbean, and using our frigates as part of a global commerce raiding campaign.
The Barbary pirates are a constant nuisance and our fleet should continue its patrols with frigates and other ships to protect our trade against them.
War is not viewed as a serious possibility against any other power. Against the Dutch, our focus would be on winning naval superiority against them to blockade them, while invading their colonies in the West Indies and parts of India. Against the Portuguese, the distance is too great to conduct a blockade, but some invasion of Brazil might be contemplated as well as attacks in India. No other nation has any serious threat or gains which can be made against them, and our operations would suffice with commerce raiding.
It is understood that principal objectives for the navy should be a continued and measured expansion of its forces as economic conditions allow. As potential enemies include both nations which are weaker than us, and nations which are significantly stronger, our fleet can neither focus on a purely battle line role nor upon a commerce raiding war. Instead, we should constitute a balanced fleet, based upon ships of the line, frigates, and a complement of gunboats for littoral defense, supporting amphibious operations, and wearing down enemy forces attempting a close blockade of our shores. With such a fleet we can form an important part of a fleet against any power bloc and hence making our own diplomatic position secure, as well as holding against any Baltic power.
The other aspect which is envisioned as important for the continued enhancement of the marine is improvement to coastal defenses. Naturally, given our extensive coast line, it is not possible to secure all of it with guns. However, some parts must be. It is envisioned that Copenhagen will receive a modernization of its artillery with a larger number of better protected, more modern guns, to defend the navy's ship anchorages. The Lillebelt should be fortified in the West, with gun batteries positioned on both shores near Middelfart, with multiple batteries positioned at various locations to close this area where the strait is barely, and often less than, a kilometer wide. Oslo has superb naval geography to resist assault, but gun positions should be expanded at Oscaborg, and combined with mobile forces it should be enough to prevent any landing at the city itself. Occasional strengthening of batteries along the rest of Norway and Denmark is envisioned, but Norway is best defended with gunboats, while the Danish army should be able to defend the rest of Jutland. The one exception is Heligoland, which with extensive fortifications can provide for an important forward naval base, which can defend coastal shipping to Holland or France. This would be composed of gun batteries, anti-landing defenses, barracks, tunnels, supply and ammunition magazines, and a significant naval base for supply and repair of ships. Overseas, it is envisioned that minor fortifications can be constructed to protect Iceland but their main defense is how worthless they are, while the Danish West Indies receive additional gun batteries and fortifications, intended to enable them to survive a lengthy siege. African or Indian possessions are not worth the cost of fortifying. Our colonial efforts which are ongoing in Diego Saurez in Madagascar already are envisioned to have sufficient defenses.
These coastal fortifications are not intended to simply act on their own, but rather to work in partnership with our fleet to protect our possessions, to provide additional strategic mobility, and to free up naval assets for usage elsewhere.[/code]
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