Section française de l'union de l'indépendence vietnamienne
The Revolution in Indochina continues to bring victory after victory to the workers and peasants of Vietnam. Long live the great Lenin! Long live the sacred eight fold path! However, it is clear that there must be efforts made to attempt to encourage the French to grant independence to Vietnam, through political action in the Metropole. Insufficient action has been placed upon this vital vector for the development of the UIV's activities, despite the fact that there is a substantial Vietnamese population in France. Resultantly, it has been decided to form a French section of our party to attempt to rally them to our cause.
Several scores of thousands of Vietnamese people have settled, or have been settled in France. They have come for education often, from the Mandarin and elite classes, particularly before the Great War. These groups are difficult to wield to our cause, given that they are tied at the hilt to their class loyalties and the French. However, there have also been large influxes of soldiers, workers, farmers, laborers, and service workers brought because of the war: huge numbers of Vietnamese factory workers served in the French factories to free up troops for the front. Their concentration is principally in the Southern part of the country, particularly around Marseille.
We have tangible benefits which can be gained by cultivating these Vietnamese for the cause. For one, raising the class consciousness of all workers is necessary for the revolution to proceed: how else can we succeed in a global revolution? Organizing and inspiring the workers of France of all races is needed for our inevitable victory, and the victory in Vietnam would be assured by our victory in France. Their presence in strike waves, either as passive agents or helping to raise them, will impede French war production. Other workers can hopefully be turned away from the bourgeois order towards the path of the revolution with their noble example. Furthermore, we can attempt to forge professional lobbying and contact links, useful both to pressure the French government and to help with building up infrastructure for later negotiations, and enabling us to gain the ear of other European governments and the League of Nations. This would be particularly the role of intellectuals, although noted we are cautious about how many can be turned asides from their reactionary attitudes to instead support the independence of the Buddhist and Communist Vietnam. But nevertheless we will try, and French universities are admittedly well known for their tendency to produce agitators, so it may have some success.
Secondly, there is much that is to be gained directly for Vietnam. Sympathizers in France can help to provide intelligence information for us, reporting on the state of morale, on troop deployments, on material production. We can hope to receive financial support and donations from our comrades in France, arms smuggling, as well as their intellectual support and assistance with training. The war can be made more unpopular with their agitation, making the French in France aware of the struggle which goes on in Vietnam. Possibly, there is even the potential of sabotage in France, as well as the spreading of anti-war propaganda, posters, and information. Even beyond propaganda, simply providing information about the war and the legitimate struggles of the Vietnamese people for independence will naturally carry great benefits.
The organization will be carried out with a two-fold organization in France of a French section of the Vietnamese Independence Union. There will be a cover organization, which will as far as possible, attempt to be legal, respectable, and constitutional, conducting a peaceful and non-violent campaign to swing French opinion on Vietnam and to work against the war. Their presence will make organization, rallying, and contact to Vietnamese in France much easier. We have little expectation of success here, as it is imagined that the French government will rapidly ban it, but it will be tried regardless. Secondly, there will be various organizations that will accept being declared illegal and banned by the French state, operating covertly to attempt to support our cause. Both will reach out and attempt to offer benefits and communal organization to Vietnamese in France, beyond any formally overt political organization, such as helping them find housing, jobs, providing loans, security, protection, information, cultural activities, healthcare, etc., as financially supported by the Vietnamese there themselves. In doing so, it can increase the attractiveness of the body, and hence help to draw more Vietnamese into it.
Several scores of thousands of Vietnamese people have settled, or have been settled in France. They have come for education often, from the Mandarin and elite classes, particularly before the Great War. These groups are difficult to wield to our cause, given that they are tied at the hilt to their class loyalties and the French. However, there have also been large influxes of soldiers, workers, farmers, laborers, and service workers brought because of the war: huge numbers of Vietnamese factory workers served in the French factories to free up troops for the front. Their concentration is principally in the Southern part of the country, particularly around Marseille.
We have tangible benefits which can be gained by cultivating these Vietnamese for the cause. For one, raising the class consciousness of all workers is necessary for the revolution to proceed: how else can we succeed in a global revolution? Organizing and inspiring the workers of France of all races is needed for our inevitable victory, and the victory in Vietnam would be assured by our victory in France. Their presence in strike waves, either as passive agents or helping to raise them, will impede French war production. Other workers can hopefully be turned away from the bourgeois order towards the path of the revolution with their noble example. Furthermore, we can attempt to forge professional lobbying and contact links, useful both to pressure the French government and to help with building up infrastructure for later negotiations, and enabling us to gain the ear of other European governments and the League of Nations. This would be particularly the role of intellectuals, although noted we are cautious about how many can be turned asides from their reactionary attitudes to instead support the independence of the Buddhist and Communist Vietnam. But nevertheless we will try, and French universities are admittedly well known for their tendency to produce agitators, so it may have some success.
Secondly, there is much that is to be gained directly for Vietnam. Sympathizers in France can help to provide intelligence information for us, reporting on the state of morale, on troop deployments, on material production. We can hope to receive financial support and donations from our comrades in France, arms smuggling, as well as their intellectual support and assistance with training. The war can be made more unpopular with their agitation, making the French in France aware of the struggle which goes on in Vietnam. Possibly, there is even the potential of sabotage in France, as well as the spreading of anti-war propaganda, posters, and information. Even beyond propaganda, simply providing information about the war and the legitimate struggles of the Vietnamese people for independence will naturally carry great benefits.
The organization will be carried out with a two-fold organization in France of a French section of the Vietnamese Independence Union. There will be a cover organization, which will as far as possible, attempt to be legal, respectable, and constitutional, conducting a peaceful and non-violent campaign to swing French opinion on Vietnam and to work against the war. Their presence will make organization, rallying, and contact to Vietnamese in France much easier. We have little expectation of success here, as it is imagined that the French government will rapidly ban it, but it will be tried regardless. Secondly, there will be various organizations that will accept being declared illegal and banned by the French state, operating covertly to attempt to support our cause. Both will reach out and attempt to offer benefits and communal organization to Vietnamese in France, beyond any formally overt political organization, such as helping them find housing, jobs, providing loans, security, protection, information, cultural activities, healthcare, etc., as financially supported by the Vietnamese there themselves. In doing so, it can increase the attractiveness of the body, and hence help to draw more Vietnamese into it.
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